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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀects of monetary policy implementation on
the euro area money market. In particular, volatility of interest rates
with various maturities and volatility transmission along the yield curve
is analyzed. It is found that the way how monetary policy is implemented
aﬀects volatility of most money market rates, except the twelve-month
rate. These eﬀects are strongest at the short end of the yield curve.
However, for ﬁrms’ investment and households’ consumption decisions
longer term rates are most relevant, which indicates that the real eﬀects of
the operating procedure in place are limited. Furthermore, some calendar
day eﬀects are documented.
JEL classiﬁcation: E52; E58; E43.
Keywords: Money markets; EONIA rate; Volatility transmission;
Central bank operating procedures.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Nowadays most central banks target a short-term interest rate in order to
achieve their primary objectives, like price stability. By signalling its target
rate and managing the liquidity situation in the money market a central bank
steers short-term money market rates. This paper describes how the European
Central Bank manages the liquidity situation in the money market and its im-
plications for interest rates of various maturities. In particular, volatility of
interest rates and its transmission along the yield curve is discussed extensively.
Central banks diﬀer substantially in how they manage the liquidity situation
in the money market. These diﬀerences in the operational framework may have
implications for the behavior of interest rates, in particular for their volatility.
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1Central banks are eager to avoid high volatility, especially for interest rates with
long maturities. Firstly, high volatility of money market rates may give mar-
ket participants confusing signals on the monetary policy stance. However, the
central bank wants to communicate its monetary policy stance clearly, without
u n n e c e s s a r yn o i s e ,a n d ,t h e r e f o r e ,a v o id high volatility. Secondly, and maybe
even more important, long-term interest rates are relevant for ﬁrms’ investment
and households’ consumption decisions. High volatility of an asset’s price re-
quires, in general, higher returns on this asset and, therefore, increases the costs
of an investment. Again, there are beneﬁts of avoiding high volatility.
High volatility of interest rates at the short end of the yield curve is less of
a concern. Volatility at the short end - as long as it is not transmitted along
the yield curve - is mainly interpreted as money market noise, without aﬀecting
the real side of the economy. This paper analyses volatility in money market
rates and its transmission from the short to the long end of the yield curve. It
provides insights into the operational framework of the European Central Bank
and the eﬀects of this framework on money market rates.
This paper is not only important for the conduct of monetary policy, but also
to understand better the term structure of interest rates. It is widely accepted
that short-term rates explain a large part of the movements in longer term rates.
In this paper money market rates of various maturities are modelled carefully.
The empirical model speciﬁcations for both, conditional mean and volatility are
tested extensively for omitted variables.
There exists very little empirical evidence for euro area money markets rates
and transmission of volatility along the yield curve. Related work has been
done for the UK (e.g. Wetherilt, 2002 and Panigirtzoglou et al, 2000) and for
some other countries. The sample period in most of these other studies ends
in or before 1998, the year preceding the creation of the European Monetary
Union (e.g. Cohen, 1999 and Ayuso et al, 1997). The only publications dealing
with the euro area money market are Cassola and Morana (2003 and 2004).
These papers contain many insights, nevertheless, the present study improves
on them in several respects. First of all, it bases the analysis on a careful
theoretical model of the overnight interest rate. The overnight interest rate is
the starting point of the yield curve and plays a crucial rule in explaining interest
rates further out on the yield curve. In addition, the overnight interest rate is
closely related to the conduct of monetary policy, especially to the operating
procedures in place. The present study tests explicitly for the eﬀects of the
operating procedure on the behavior of interest rates. Furthermore, a diﬀerent
methodology is used and the sample period is extended considerably.
The next section discusses the data used and the general methodology. Sec-
tion three provides a model of the euro area overnight rate, the so-called EONIA
rate. The EONIA rate is a very important rate in the conduct of euro area mon-
etary policy. The EONIA rate represents the short end of the money market
yield curve and it is heavily inﬂuenced by the European Central Bank’s policy
decisions. Section four models interest rates of longer maturities. The condi-
tional volatility of the EONIA rate is included as an explanatory variable for
the volatility of all other interest rates. This is a straightforward way to test
2for transmission of volatility along the yield curve. Section ﬁve concludes. The
appendix contains all tables and ﬁgures.
2D a t a a n d M e t h o d o l o g y
The interest rates used in this study are an overnight rate (EONIA rate), and
EONIA swap rates with maturities of two weeks, and one, three, six and twelve
months. Ideally repo rates should have been chosen, because repo transactions
are based on collateral and, therefore, do not involve any credit risk. After all,
there is still no uniﬁed repo market for the euro area. Instead EONIA swap
rates have emerged as a benchmark for the euro area money market. The
E O N I As w a pm a r k e ti sv e r yl i q u i da n dt h er i s ki n v o l v e di sv e r ys m a l l . I na n
EONIA swap two parties agree to exchange the diﬀerence between the agreed
ﬁxed interest rate and the EONIA rate, accrued over a given period and for
an agreed notional amount. Since the principal amount is not exchanged, the
credit risk involved in swap transactions is very low.
The sample starts at 24/03/1999 and ends at 19/02/2004. Daily averages of
bid and ask quotes from Reuters (for all money market rates, except the six and
twelve-month swap rates) and Bloomberg (for the six and twelve-month swap
rates) are used. Descriptive statistics for all money market rates are provided
in table 1, in the appendix.
The model applied for all interest rates follows closely Moschitz (2004).1
Both, conditional mean and volatility of the respective interest rate are esti-
mated jointly. The speciﬁcation takes into account the operational framework
of the euro area, models it carefully and tests extensively for omitted variables.2
Standard unit root tests conﬁrm that all interest rates, within the sample, are
integrated of order one. Furthermore, they are co-integrated with the target
rate, i∗
t. The target rate is assumed to be the ﬁxed rate (until June 27, 2000)
and the minimum bid rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central
Bank conducts its weekly open market operations.3 Therefore, all interest rates,
it, are modelled in ﬁrst diﬀerences, ∆it ≡ (it − it−1), and a unit co-integrating
vector, (it−1 − i∗
t−1), is imposed.4 The model then is:













|ηt−1| − E|ηt−1| + γηt−1
ª
ηt ∼ iid(0,p+( 1− p) ∗ σ2).
1See the references therein. Hamilton (e.g. 1997) was one of the ﬁrst authors to study the
behavior of short-term interest rates by using advanced time-series techniques.
2Selected results for tests on omitted variables are discussed in the relevant sections below.
The full set of results is available from the author.
3The target or policy rate, as deﬁned here, coincides with the mid-point of the deposit and
marginal lending rate. Only for the ﬁrst few weeks in 1999 the corridor formed by deposit
and lending rate was not symmetric around the policy rate.
4Results on tests for the order of integration and co-integration are not reported. All test
results are available from the author.
3The parameter φ captures how fast the interest rate, it, returns to its long-run
value, the target rate i∗
t. The mean equation includes a constant, c, and other
explanatory variables, xt. The vector xt contains lags of the dependent variable
and the target rate, as well as variables related to the operating procedure and
to calendar days. The conditional standard deviation of the interest rate is given
by ht. The vector zt contains explanatory variables for the conditional volatility
equation. Of particular interest are variables related to the operating procedure
and calendar days. Standardized residuals are denoted by ηt.S o m e o f t h e
interest rates are characterized by frequent small changes and occasional large
moves. This behavior is modelled with a mixture of two normal distributions.
The probability to come from the ﬁrst distribution with variance one is p,a n dt h e
probability to come from the second distribution with variance σ2 is (1−p).T h e
exponential GARCH model applied here allows to estimate the diﬀerent impact
good and bad news have on the volatility, which is given by the parameter γ.5
Further details of the models are explained in the respective sections.
3 Overnight interest rate (EONIA)
The EONIA rate is a volume-weighted average of interbank rates in the euro
area and is a particularly important interest rate. It is important for the conduct
of monetary policy, but also to understand the term structure of interest rates.
It deﬁnes the short end of the yield curve and potentially inﬂuences all other
interest rates further out the maturity spectrum.
The EONIA rate is the price paid for reserves held at the central bank. On
the interbank market commercial banks actively trade these reserve holdings.
The main reasons for holding reserves are transaction purposes and to meet the
reserve requirement imposed by the central bank. The reserve requirement has
not to be met on a daily basis, but on average over one month, the reserve
maintenance period (RMP).6 Proﬁt maximizing banks, therefore, hold reserves
when they are relatively cheap, and lend reserves to other banks when they are
relatively expensive. Hence, the expected future interest rate is an important
explanatory variable for today’s reserve holdings, and, thus, today’s interest
rate. The expected future interest rate depends mainly on two factors, the
expected supply of reserves and the expected target interest rate.
The central bank is the sole net supplier of reserves, in consequence, it has a
strong inﬂuence on this market. Nevertheless, the central bank cannot control
the reserve supply perfectly. Supply shocks hit the reserve market, moving the
reserve supply unexpectedly. After all, the institutional details of how and when
the central bank supplies reserves have an important - and expected - impact
on the EONIA rate, both on mean and volatility. Supply of reserves is executed
5See e.g. Bollerslev et al (1992) for an overview of models for conditionial volatility.
6Throughout the sample period, the reserve maintenance period starts at the 24th of each
month and ends at the 23rd of the following month. From March 2004 onwards begin and end
of the reserve maintenance periods will be related to the European Central Bank’s Governing
Council meetings.
4through open market operations, in general, via a weekly auction. Usually, on
every Tuesday the respective amount is allotted and settled on Wednesday. In
what follows these days are labelled allotment and settlement days.
The empirical model for the EONIA rate follows closely Moschitz (2004).
His speciﬁcation is based on a theoretical model for both supply and demand
for reserves, which recognizes that the EONIA rate is the equilibrium interest
rate in the market for reserves.
Parameter estimates for this model are given in table 2, in the appendix.
Figure 1 plots the conditional log volatility for the EONIA rate. To get a better
intuition for the driving forces of volatility, Figure 2 zooms in the previous graph
and shows the volatility starting in 2003. Volatility increases around the end
of the reserve maintenance period, as well as around the end of the month and
around policy rate changes -March and June 2003- are clearly visible.
Since June 2000 the ECB performs its weekly auction with a minimum bid
rate. Whenever there are expectations of an imminent cut in this minimum bid
rate, the policy rate, commercial banks may want to postpone reserve holdings
till the next week. Therefore, demand for reserves can fall short of the amount
the central banks plans to allot. This so-called underbidding has led to higher
volatility, as can be seen in panel G of table 2.
The mean of the EONIA rate moves in reaction to permanent changes in
supply (see e.g. Moschitz, 2004, for further details). Supply of reserves may
be endogenous, therefore, supply shocks are used as instruments to measure
correctly the slope of the demand curve. Any supply shock occurring after the
last open market operation of the reserve maintenance period is a permanent
change in supply since it aﬀects the reserve situation for the entire maintenance
period. This is so, because the central bank is not able anymore to make up
for past supply shocks. Although, at any other open market operation, except
the last one, the central bank neutralizes past supply shocks. The slope of the
demand curve is estimated to be roughly eight basis points per one billion of
euro. A permanent change of reserves by one billion euro moves the EONIA rate
by eight basis points into the opposite direction. Interestingly, supply shocks
occurring after the last open market operation, but before the last day of the
RMP do not have any immediate eﬀect. They impact on the EONIA rate only
at the last day of the RMP, as can be seen in panel A of table 2. Lagrange
multiplier tests show that supply changes occurring at any other day do not
aﬀect the EONIA rate. A test for the signiﬁcance of the respective parameter
has a p-values of 0.5. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Supply
changes at any other day are temporary, and, therefore, should not have an
eﬀect on the interest rate.
Besides changes in reserves also the expected future target or policy rate
inﬂuences the EONIA rate. The future expected policy rate is measured by a
forward rate.7 O n l yc h a n g e si nt h ep o l i c yr a t ew h i c ho c c u ri nt h ec u r r e n tR M P
are relevant for the current EONIA rate. Therefore, the expected future policy
7The two and one-week EONIA swap rates are used to construct the one-week rate in one
week. In Moschitz (2004) rates with other maturities have been used, but results are almost
identical.
5rate is easiest to approximate at the ﬁrst day of each RMP. As the end of the
RMP is approached expectations of policy rate changes in the following RMP
become more important for the forward rate. Indeed, the parameter for the
expected future policy rate is only signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁrst
day of the RMP.
The only calendar day eﬀects found in the present study are related to the
end and begin of a month. The EONIA rate increases at the last day of each
month by 5 basis points. At the end of the second quarter the increase is 18 basis
points and at the end of the year 30 basis points. These increases are completely
reversed at the ﬁrst day of the following month. These calendar day eﬀects are
not easily explained in a theoretical model (e.g. Moschitz, 2004). These eﬀects
are likely to be the result of window dressing, i.e. companies adjusting their
balance sheets at the end of the month. There is not much the central bank can
do to counteract these end of the month eﬀects. Changes in reserves supply at
these days would be seen as temporary changes and, therefore, not aﬀect the
interest rate. Explicit tests for liquidity eﬀects around the end of the month
conﬁrm this intuition (see table 9).
The here discussed model has been tested extensively for omitted variables.
Tables 9 to 12 give the potentially omitted variables for which both, mean and
volatility equations have been tested for. A few results are worth mentioning in
more detail. Throughout the sample period the number of days which pass after
the last allotment until the last day of the reserve maintenance period varies
every month. In general, the last allotment is performed on Tuesday and the
last day in a reserve maintenance period is the 23rd of each month. However,
there have been some recent changes in the operational framework of the ECB,
becoming eﬀective from March 2004 onwards (see e.g. ECB, 2004). Now, there
are always ﬁve (business) days after the last allotment until the last day of the
RMP. It is therefore interesting to test if the volatility increase at the end of
the RMP depends on the number of days after the last allotment day. Lagrange
multiplier tests, as outlined in panels D to G of table 10, indicate that the
number of days after the last allotment day does not matter for volatility.
4 Money market interest rates
4.1 Model speciﬁcation and estimation results
One of the main motivations for this paper is to test for the transmission of
volatility from the short end of the yield curve to the long end. As has been
seen in the previous section the operating procedures, i.e. institutional details of
how monetary policy is implemented, explain a considerable part of both mean
and volatility of the EONIA rate. In this section it is investigated how much of
the EONIA volatility is transmitted to interest rates with longer maturity. This
is an important question to answer. Central banks are concerned of keeping
volatility low, especially at the long end of the yield curve. Therefore, it is
crucial to know if certain operating procedures imply high volatility across the
6term spectrum of interest rates, or if high volatility is limited to the short end.
Furthermore, ﬁnancial agents are equally interested in learning more about the
behavior of money market rates.
In what follows money market rates with maturities from two weeks up to
one year are analyzed. The basic model is closely related to the one applied
for the EONIA rate. However, the conditional volatility of the EONIA rate, as
estimated in the previous section, is included as an explanatory variable for the
conditional volatility of all other rates. This is a straightforward way of testing
for volatility transmission along the yield curve.
The mean equation is very similar for all rates. All potential variables, as
outlined in tables 9 to 12, have been tested for. The only signiﬁcant variables are
a constant, the error-corretion term, lagged changes in the policy rate and one
lag of the dependent variable. The volatility equations are more interesting and
below the explanatory variables for each rate are explained in detail. Standard
speciﬁcation tests for each money market rate are shown in the respective tables.
All models seem to be well speciﬁed. There is no evidence of serial correlation
neither in residuals nor in squared residuals.
The estimated model for the two-week rate is given in table 3. Indeed,
there is considerable transmission of volatility. More than 30 percent of the
EONIA rate volatility is transmitted to the two-week rate. Before November
2001 monetary policy decisions were, in general, made at any of the Governing
Council meetings. However, after this date policy decisions were, as a rule, only
made at the ﬁrst meeting of every month. This change reduced the volatility of
the two-week rate signiﬁcantly.
Weekdays have been tested for volatility eﬀects. On Thursdays the log
volatility of the two-week rate increases by about 0.7. It has been seen in
the previous section that underbidding had a considerable eﬀect on the EONIA
rate, both on mean and volatility. The allotment day, on which underbidding
occurred, increases substantially the volatility of the two-week rate as well.
However, there is no eﬀect of underbidding on the mean of the two-week rate.
Some negative parameters show up in panel B and C of table 3, in particular
around the end of the maintenance period and around the end of a month. The
volatility of the EONIA rate is very high at these days. As has been seen
a substantial part of the volatility of the EONIA rate is transmitted to the
two-week rate, but on these special days, the volatility of the two-week rate
does not increase as much as the volatility of the EONIA rate. The negative
parameter values capture this eﬀect. Lagrange multiplier tests do not provide
any evidence that volatility transmission is diﬀerent at other days, than at the
days just mentioned (see table 12 for details).
Furthermore, besides the days already discussed no other calendar days or
days of the reserve maintenance period aﬀect the volatility of the two-week rate
(see tables 10 and 11).
Table 4 provides the estimated model for the one-month rate. There is still
signiﬁcant volatility transmission, however, it is lower than for the two-week
rate. About 14 percent of the EONIA volatility is transmitted to the one month
rate. In addition, volatility is higher at the days of a press conference and at
7days of a change in the policy rate. Underbidding in the open market operations
also led to an increase in volatility. Again, volatility decreased after November
2001, when policy decisions were taken, in general, only once a month. Figure
3 shows the conditional log volatility for the full sample. It shows very nicely
the decrease of volatility after November 2001, as discussed above. Figure 4
zooms in the previous graph, starting in 2003. Increases in volatility around
policy rate changes (March and June 2003) and towards the end of the RMP
are clearly visible.
Transmission of volatility is not diﬀerent across days of the RMP or on spe-
ciﬁc calendar days (see table 12). There are no other eﬀects on the conditional
volatility, neither (see tables 10 and 11).
Table 5 contains the parameter estimates for the three-month rate. Volatility
transmission is highly signiﬁcant and amounts to 13 percent. Furthermore, the
day of the press conference and the policy rate change increase volatility. The
change in the frequency of the policy decisions has had no eﬀect on the three-
month rate. A signiﬁcant part of volatility is transmitted form the overnight
maturity to the three months maturity. However, this transmission is partly
reversed on the last settlement day in a RMP and at the last day of a semester,
which can be seen by the negative parameters in panels B and C of table 5.
Besides the above mentioned eﬀects, no other explanatory variables have
been found to explain a signiﬁcant portion of the volatility of the three-month
rate (see tables 10 to 12).
Results for the six-month rate are given in table 6. Volatility transmission
stands at 14 percent. However, it is not the contemporaneous EONIA volatility,
rather the one day lagged volatility, which is transmitted. Again, the day of the
press conference increases volatility. Interestingly, the change in the frequency
at which policy rate decisions are generally made had an eﬀect. Recall that
this eﬀect is not present for the three-month rate, although it is signiﬁcant for
the two-week and one-month rates. Volatility decreased after the frequency of
policy decisions were reduced to monthly.
No other variables have been found to explain signiﬁcantly the volatility of
the six-month rate (see tables 10 to 12).
It has been documented that there is substantial transmission of volatility
along the yield curve, up to a maturity of six months. The twelve-month rate is
diﬀerent, as can be observed in table 7. The EONIA volatility has no eﬀect on
the twelve-month rate. The only signiﬁcant parameter for the volatility equation
are those on the day of the press conference and the day of a policy rate change.
Figure 5 shows the conditional log volatility for the twelve-month rate, starting
in 2003. No clear pattern can be observed, except for the policy rate changes in
March and June 2003. In other words, volatility is transmitted along the yield
curve, but not too far out. The twelve-month rate seems to be the inﬂection
point. None of the numerous other explanatory variables which are tested are
found to be signiﬁcant (see tables 10 to 12).
84.2 Volatility curve
One way of summarizing the results of this paper is to plot the volatility curve
of the euro area money market rates. A volatility curve shows a measure of
volatility for interest rates with diﬀerent maturities, plotted against their ma-
turities. The here estimated volatility curve has a U-shape, as can be observed
in ﬁgure 6. This pattern has been documented also for the US (e.g. Piazzesi,
2001). Volatility is high at the short end of the yield curve, decreases up to six-
month maturity and then increases again. The increase in volatility beyond the
six-month rate may be related to interest rate smoothing of the central bank.
Central banks usually adjust the target interest rate in several small steps. Fi-
nancial markets, therefore, expect a change in the interest rate to be followed
by another change. However, there is uncertainty when this change actually
will occur. This uncertainty is then reﬂected in the volatility of interest rates
with maturity larger than six months. High volatility at the short end of the
yield curve is related mainly to money market noise. Money market noise sum-
marizes the eﬀects of short-term changes in liquidity in the money market and
uncertainty about imminent policy rate changes.
The entire volatility curve shifts up at days of the central bank’s policy
meetings. At these days volatility for all money market rates is higher than at
"normal" days. Figure 6 plots the volatility curve for policy meeting days and
the remaining, "normal", days. From the beginning of 1999 up to November
2001 policy decisions were made (in general) at each of the bi-weekly ECB’s
Governing Council meetings. From November 2001 onwards the frequency of
policy decisions changed to monthly. Only the ﬁrst Governing Council meeting
in each month, which coincides also with the Press Conference, is a policy
meeting. Note that this change in the frequency of policy meetings seems to
have reduced volatility in the money market, especially at the short end.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper studies the eﬀects of monetary policy implementation on the euro
area money market. In particular, volatility of interest rates with various matu-
rities and volatility transmission along the yield curve is analyzed. It has been
shown that the operating procedure explains a substantial part of the behav-
ior of interest rates. The further out the term structure, the less important is
the operating procedure. Nevertheless, money market rates up to six months
maturity are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the way how the central bank implements
its monetary policy decisions. The one year rate is the inﬂection point. Press
conferences and changes in the target rate are the only events which aﬀect its
volatility. Notwithstanding, ﬁrms’ investment and households’ consumption de-
cisions depend more on longer term rates, which indicates that real eﬀects of
the operating procedure in place are limited.
A natural extension of this work is to look at rates further out the maturity
spectrum, or to include other money market rates, like repo or Euribor rates.
9Most likely the results presented here will be conﬁrmed. The one year rate is
disconnected from the operating procedure, therefore, it seems likely that rates
with longer maturities are largely independent from operating procedures as
well. Macroeconomic news are the probable candidates to explain volatility of
long-term rates, not the operating procedure. In the present analysis swap rates
have been used, because they have emerged as a euro area benchmark for the
money market. It would be interesting to use repo rates, since they do not
involve credit risk. However, for the time being there does not exist a uniﬁed
repo market. The use of Euribor rates is more complex, because the credit risk
is substantially higher than for swap rates. This credit risk then would have to
be modelled somehow. Nevertheless, there are no obvious reasons why operating
procedures should aﬀect other money market rates, like repo or Euribor rates,
but not aﬀecting swap rates, and vice versa. Therefore, it is likely that the
results presented here will be conﬁrmed.
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11A Basic statistics and estimation results
Table 1
Basic statistics for euro area money markets
 Maturity 
  Overnight  Two weeks  One month  Three months  Six months  Twelve months 
 Level 
Mean  3.343 3.342 3.345 3.352 3.378 3.480 
Std.  dev.  0.931 0.901 0.905 0.916 0.933 0.951 
Skewness 0.283 0.277 0.280 0.268 0.231 0.137 
Kurtosis  2.043 1.896 1.894 1.901 1.937 1.949 
Maximum  5.750 4.945 4.935 5.065 5.145 5.275 
Minimum 1.340 1.981 2.012 2.005 1.943 1.825 
  
 First  differences 
Mean  0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Std.  dev.  0.143 0.043 0.040 0.038 0.037 0.040 
Skewness  0.884 -0.581 -0.549 -0.717 -1.073 0.248 
Kurtosis  16.745 22.882 26.257 42.201 88.475  5.042 
Maximum  1.160 0.268 0.285 0.370 0.525 0.180 
Minimum -0.980 -0.420 -0.368 -0.415 -0.580 -0.188 
NOTE: All statistics are computed for EONIA swap rates, except for the overnight maturity, which is the EONIA rate itself. The EONIA 




Parameter estimates for the Overnight Interest Rate (EONIA)
 
Model:  ∆it = c + φ(it-1 - i
*
t-1) + xtβ + htηt 
              ln(ht
2) = ztλ + Σj δj { ln(ht-j
2) - zt-jλ } + α{|ηt-1| - E|ηt-1| + γηt-1} 
              ηt ~ iid( 0, p + (1-p)*σ
2 ). 
Sample: All business days from 24/03/1999 to 19/02/2004, both included. 
 
Variable Parameter  Std.  Error  p-value 
Mean equation       
(A) Liquidity effects at the last day in a RMP, t = T       
uT-1  -0.077 0.014  0.000 
uT-2  -0.055 0.009  0.000 
uT-3 + uT-4 + uT-5  -0.052 0.009  0.000 
uT  -0.046 0.009  0.000 
      
(B) Expected future policy rate       
Et[i
*
t+k] at the first day in a RMP, t = 1  0.628  0.060  0.000 
Et[i
*
t+k] at other days, t = 2,…,T  0.000  0.007  0.946 
      
(C) Calendar day effects       
End of month, reversed begin of month; except end of semester  0.051  0.002  0.000 
End of 2
nd quarter, reversed begin of 3
rd quarter  0.178  0.020  0.000 
End of 4
th quarter, reversed begin of 1
st quarter  0.310  0.033  0.000 
      
(D) Other variables       
First day in a RMP, t = 1  0.030  0.005  0.000 
dunderbidding -0.303  0.014  0.000 
( it-1 - it-2 )*(1 - first day - begin of month)  0.067  0.011  0.000 
Constant 0.001  <0.001  0.173 
Error correction term (it-1 - i
*
t-1) at the first day in a RMP, t = 1  -1.000  -  - 
Error correction term (it-1 - i
*
t-1) at all other days, t = 2,…T  -0.040  0.008  0.000 
 
13Table 2 (continued)
Variable Parameter  Std.  Error  p-value 
Volatility  equation     
(E) Days of reserve maintenance period       
First day, t = 1  1.516  0.194  0.000 
Last allotment day  0.841  0.250  0.001 
All days after last allotment  3.045  0.381  0.000 
Next to last day, t = T-1  1.850  0.393  0.000 
Last day, t = T  2.315  0.510  0.000 
     
(F) Calendar days       
End of month and the day before  0.471  0.171  0.006 
Begin and end of a quarter, additionally  1.500  0.665  0.024 
Begin and end of a semester, additionally  2.170  0.455  0.000 
Policy rate change and the day after  1.087  0.287  0.000 
   
(G) Other dummy variables       
dunderbidding 1.754  0.195  0.000 
GC meeting after last allotment (Sep and Oct 1999)  4.028  0.291  0.000 
Underbidding at end of RMP (Dec 2003)  1.047  0.356  0.003 
January 2002 (Cash changeover)  3.175  0.725  0.000 
   
(H)  EGARCH  parameters     
Constant -6.394  0.151  0.000 
α 2.403  0.211  0.000 
δ 0.678  0.037  0.000 
g 0.089  0.033  0.007 
s 0.203  0.011  0.000 
p 0.324  0.003  0.000 
Standardised residuals:     
Mean 0.019     
Variance 0.368     
Skewness 0.599     
Kurtosis 12.657     
Q(20), p-value  0.023     
Q(20) for squared residuals, p-value  0.970     
NOTE: it = volume-weighted average of interbank rates in the euro area, the EONIA rate. i
*
t = policy rate, or target rate, which is defined as the fixed rate 
(until June 27, 2000) and the minimum bid rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central Bank conducts its weekly open market operations. 
Any change in the policy rate is assumed to become effective at the day of announcement, not at the day when the next open market operation is settled. 
All rates are quoted as annual rates, e.g. it = 5 means a five percent annual interest rate. Liquidity effects in panel A are estimated using the relevant 
supply changes, i.e. those occurring at or after the last allotment day in each RMP. See appendix B and the main text for a detailed description of the 
variables used in the estimation. The parameters in the variance equation represent the effect on the log of the conditional volatility. A zero liquidity effect 
is tested for and then imposed at two underbidding episodes and after Easter 2003. The respective days are 23/10/2001, 23/12/2002 and 23/04/2003. Q(j) 
denotes the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation at lag length j.  
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Parameter estimates for the Two-week EONIA Swap Rate
 
Model:   ∆it = c + φ(it-1 - i
*
t-1) + xtβ + htηt 
              ln(ht
2) = ztλ + Σj δj { ln(ht-j
2) - zt-jλ } + α{|ηt-1| - E|ηt-1| + γηt-1} 
              ηt ~ iid( 0, p + (1-p)*σ
2 ). 
Sample: All business days from 24/03/1999 to 19/02/2004, both included 
 
Variable Parameter  Std.  Error  p-value 
Mean equation       
Constant 0.001  0.001  0.173 
Error correction term (it-1 - i
*
t-1) -0.029  0.011  0.010 
Lagged change of the policy rate  0.256  0.045  0.000 
Lagged dependent variable  -0.085  0.025  0.001 
    
Volatility equation       
(A) Transmission of volatility       
Conditional EONIA volatility  0.311  0.039  0.000 
    
(B) Days of maintenance period       
Policy decisions bi-weekly  1.491  0.224  0.000 
Last day, t = T  -1.936  0.294  0.000 
Next to last day, t = T-1  -1.416  0.311  0.000 
First day, t = 1  -0.781  0.235  0.001 
      
(C) Calendar days       
End of month  -0.959  0.217  0.000 
Thursday 0.801  0.128  0.000 
    
(C) Other variables       
Underbidding allotment day  2.516  0.837  0.003 
Constant -4.651  0.372  0.000 
α 1.026  0.165  0.000 
δ 0.907  0.021  0.000 
g 0.047  0.051  0.356 
s 0.339  0.022  0.000 
p   0.174  0.003  0.000 
Standardised residuals:      
Mean 0.000     
Variance 0.282     
Skewness 0.096     
Kurtosis 10.793     
Q(10), p-value  0.395     
Q(20), p-value  0.010     
Q(20) for squared residuals, p-value  0.557     
NOTE: it = two-week EONIA swap rate. i
*
t = policy rate, or target rate, which is defined as the fixed rate (until June 27, 2000) and the 
minimum bid rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central Bank conducts its weekly open market operations. Any change in 
the policy rate is assumed to become effective at the day of announcement, not at the day when the next open market operation is settled. 
All rates are quoted as annual rates, e.g. it = 5 means a five percent annual interest rate. See appendix B for a detailed description of the 
variables used in the estimation. The parameters in the variance equation represent the effect on the log of the conditional volatility. Q(j) 
denotes the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation at lag length j. Conditional EONIA volatility stands for the logarithm of the conditional 
EONIA volatility as estimated with the model described in table 2. 
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Parameter estimates for the One-month EONIA Swap Rate
 
Model:   ∆it = c + φ(it-1 - i
*
t-1) + xtβ + htηt 
              ln(ht
2) = ztλ + Σj δj { ln(ht-j
2) - zt-jλ } + α{|ηt-1| - E|ηt-1| + γηt-1} 
              ηt ~ iid( 0, p + (1-p)*σ
2 ). 
Sample: All business days from 24/03/1999 to 19/02/2004, both included 
 
Variable Parameter  Std.  Error  p-value 
Mean equation       
Constant -0.001  0.001  0.013 
Error correction term (it-1 - i
*
t-1) 0.008  0.007  0.232 
Lagged change of the policy rate  0.176  0.084  0.037 
Lagged dependent variable  -0.065  0.023  0.005 
    
Volatility equation       
(A) Transmission of volatility       
Conditional EONIA volatility  0.134  0.033  0.000 
    
(B) Days of maintenance period       
Press conference  0.938  0.265  0.000 
Policy rate change  2.879  0.542  0.000 
Policy decisions bi-weekly  1.611  0.168  0.000 
First day, t = 1  0.726  0.237  0.002 
      
(C) Other variables       
Underbidding allotment day  3.010  0.550  0.000 
Constant -6.227  0.335  0.000 
α 1.434  0.199  0.000 
δ 0.800  0.052  0.000 
g -0.103  0.052  0.047 
s 0.277  0.017  0.000 
p   0.185  0.002  0.000 
Standardised residuals:      
Mean 0.008     
Variance 0.254     
Skewness 0.702     
Kurtosis 13.221     
Q(20), p-value  0.050     
Q(20) for squared residuals, p-value  0.991     
NOTE: it = one-month EONIA swap rate. i
*
t = policy rate, or target rate, which is defined as the fixed rate (until June 27, 2000) and the 
minimum bid rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central Bank conducts its weekly open market operations. Any change in 
the policy rate is assumed to become effective at the day of announcement, not at the day when the next open market operation is settled. 
All rates are quoted as annual rates, e.g. it = 5 means a five percent annual interest rate. See appendix B for a detailed description of the 
variables used in the estimation. The parameters in the variance equation represent the effect on the log of the conditional volatility. Q(j) 
denotes the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation at lag length j. Conditional EONIA volatility stands for the logarithm of the conditional 
EONIA volatility as estimated with the model described in table 2. 
 
16Table 5
Parameter estimates for the Three-month EONIA Swap Rate
 
Model:   ∆it = c + φ(it-1 - i
*
t-1) + xtβ + htηt 
              ln(ht
2) = ztλ + Σj δj { ln(ht-j
2) - zt-jλ } + α{|ηt-1| - E|ηt-1| + γηt-1} 
              ηt ~ iid( 0, p + (1-p)*σ
2 ). 
Sample: All business days from 24/03/1999 to 19/02/2004, both included 
 
Variable Parameter  Std.  Error  p-value 
Mean equation       
Constant -0.002  0.000  0.000 
Error correction term (it-1 - i
*
t-1)  0.020 0.003 0.000 
Lagged change of the policy rate  0.091  0.048  0.056 
Lagged dependent variable  -0.036  0.019  0.059 
   
Volatility equation       
(A) Transmission of volatility       
Conditional  EONIA  volatility  0.132 0.025 0.000 
   
(B) Days of maintenance period       
Press  conference  1.001 0.243 0.000 
Policy rate change  1.534  0.444  0.001 
Last settlement day  -1.262  0.186  0.000 
   
(C) Calendar days       
End of semester  -1.257  0.347  0.000 
   
(D) Other variables       
Constant -4.462  0.328  0.000 
α  2.126 0.289 0.000 
δ1 -0.128  0.091  0.157 
δ2  0.290 0.079 0.000 
δ3  0.451 0.089 0.000 
δ4  0.324 0.076 0.000 
g -0.058  0.040  0.147 
s  0.217 0.016 0.000 
p  0.081 0.001 0.000 
Standardised residuals:     
Mean 0.006     
Variance 0.134     
Skewness 1.634     
Kurtosis 35.309     
Q(20), p-value  0.118     
Q(20) for squared residuals, p-value  0.994     
NOTE: it = three-month EONIA swap rate. i
*
t = policy rate, or target rate, which is defined as the fixed rate (until June 27, 2000) and 
the minimum bid rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central Bank conducts its weekly open market operations. Any 
change in the policy rate is assumed to become effective at the day of announcement, not at the day when the next open market 
operation is settled. All rates are quoted as annual rates, e.g. it = 5 means a five percent annual interest rate. See appendix B for a 
detailed description of the variables used in the estimation. The parameters in the variance equation represent the effect on the log of the 
conditional volatility. Q(j) denotes the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation at lag length j. Conditional EONIA volatility stands for the 
logarithm of the conditional EONIA volatility as estimated with the model described in table 2. 
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Parameter estimates for the Six-month EONIA Swap Rate
 
Model:   ∆it = c + φ(it-1 - i
*
t-1) + xtβ + htηt 
              ln(ht
2) = ztλ + Σj δj { ln(ht-j
2) - zt-jλ } + α{|ηt-1| - E|ηt-1| + γηt-1} 
              ηt ~ iid( 0, p + (1-p)*σ
2 ). 
Sample: All business days from 24/03/1999 to 19/02/2004, both included 
 
Variable Parameter  Std.  Error  p-value 
Mean equation       
Constant -0.002  0.001  0.000 
Error correction term (it-1 - i
*
t-1) 0.013  0.002  0.000 
Lagged change of the policy rate  0.063  0.025  0.011 
Lagged dependent variable  -0.059  0.029  0.042 
   
Volatility equation       
(A) Transmission of volatility       
Conditional EONIA volatility, lagged one day  0.142  0.023  0.000 
   
(B) Days of maintenance period       
Press conference  0.781  0.287  0.007 
Policy decisions bi-weekly  0.763  0.219  0.001 
   
(C) Other variables       
Constant -5.825  0.280  0.000 
α 0.995  0.164  0.000 
δ1 0.207  0.071  0.004 
δ2 0.658  0.077  0.000 
g 0.101  0.078  0.192 
s 0.417  0.025  0.000 
p 0.250  0.011  0.000 
Standardised residuals:     
Mean 0.008     
Variance 0.389     
Skewness 0.514     
Kurtosis 8.478     
Q(20), p-value  0.509     
Q(20) for squared residuals, p-value  0.336     
NOTE: it = six-month EONIA swap rate. i
*
t = policy rate, or target rate, which is defined as the fixed rate (until June 27, 2000) and the 
minimum bid rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central Bank conducts its weekly open market operations. Any change in 
the policy rate is assumed to become effective at the day of announcement, not at the day when the next open market operation is 
settled. All rates are quoted as annual rates, e.g. it = 5 means a five percent annual interest rate. See appendix B for a detailed description 
of the variables used in the estimation. The parameters in the variance equation represent the effect on the log of the conditional 
volatility. Q(j) denotes the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation at lag length j. Conditional EONIA volatility stands for the logarithm of 
the conditional EONIA volatility as estimated with the model described in table 2. 
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Parameter estimates for the Twelve-month EONIA Swap Rate
 
Model:   ∆it = c + φ(it-1 - i
*
t-1) + xtβ + htηt 
              ln(ht
2) = ztλ + Σj δj { ln(ht-j
2) - zt-jλ } + α{|ηt-1| - E|ηt-1| + γηt-1} 
              ηt ~ iid( 0, p + (1-p)*σ
2 ). 
Sample: All business days from 24/03/1999 to 19/02/2004, both included 
 
Variable Parameter  Std.  Error  p-value 
Mean  equation     
Constant -0.004  0.001  0.000 
Error correction term (it-1 - i
*
t-1) 0.009  0.002  0.000 
   
Volatility  equation     
(A)  Transmission  of  volatility     
Conditional EONIA volatility  -0.012  0.026  0.641 
   
(B) Days of maintenance period       
Press conference  0.509  0.219  0.020 
Policy change and the day after  1.016  0.332  0.002 
   
(C)  Other  variables     
Constant -7.109  0.227  0.000 
α 0.242  0.046  0.000 
δ1 0.380  0.215  0.077 
δ2 0.566  0.211  0.007 
g -0.062  0.093  0.502 
s 2.033  0.188  0.000 
p 0.832  0.247  0.000 
Standardised residuals:     
Mean 0.037     
Variance 1.546     
Skewness 0.334     
Kurtosis 4.626     
Q(20), p-value  0.075     
Q(20) for squared residuals, p-value  0.494     
NOTE: it = twelve-month EONIA swap rate. i
*
t = policy rate, or target rate, which is defined as the fixed rate (until June 27, 2000) and 
the minimum bid rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central Bank conducts its weekly open market operations. Any 
change in the policy rate is assumed to become effective at the day of announcement, not at the day when the next open market 
operation is settled. All rates are quoted as annual rates, e.g. it = 5 means a five percent annual interest rate. See appendix B for a 
detailed description of the variables used in the estimation. The parameters in the variance equation represent the effect on the log of the 
conditional volatility. Q(j) denotes the Ljung-Box test for serial correlation at lag length j. Conditional EONIA volatility stands for the 
logarithm of the conditional EONIA volatility as estimated with the model described in table 2. 
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Table 8
Description of variables used in the empirical models
Dummy variable  Takes value one at: 
T  The last day of each reserve maintenance period (RMP) 
T-1  The next to last day of each RMP  
First day, t = 1  The first day in a RMP 
Last allotment day  The last day in a RMP at which a regular main refinancing operation is allotted (usually a Tuesday) 
Last settlement day  The last day in a RMP at which a regular main refinancing operation is settled (usually a Wednesday)
Underbidding  
allotment day 
All allotment days when underbidding occurred. These days are 14/02/01, 11/04/01, 10/10/01, 
07/11/01, 04/12/02, 18/12/02, 04/03/03, 04/06/03, 26/11/03 
dunderbidding 
(Volatility equation) 
All allotment days when underbidding occurred. Additionally, some underbidding settlement days are 
also included. Namely, all underbidding settlement days for February, April and October 2001, and 
both for December 2002 (4th and 18th). Furthermore, this dummy takes value one at days 19/12/02 
till 24/12/02, to take into account volatility increase from underbidding close to the end of the RMP 
dunderbidding      
(Mean equation) 
This variable takes into account the underbidding effects for the mean, in 2002 and 2003. It takes 
value one at Wednesdays for underbidding at December 4, 2002, June 4, 2003 (settlement days), the 
day after settlement March 5, 2003 and the settlement following the underbidding week, March 12, 
2003 
January 2002  The last four days in the first RMP of 2002. Euro cash changeover 
GC meeting after      
last allotment 
Governing Council meeting after the last allotment and policy rate change expectations. Takes value 
one the days before the last allotment, 20/9/1999 and 18/10/1999 and the days before and after it, i.e. 
17/9/99 and 19/10/1999 
Policy decisions        
bi-weekly 
All days until November 7, 2001. From this time onwards policy decisions are made only once a 
month (in general) 
Press conference  The day of the press conference held after the ECB’s Governing Council meeting 
Governing Council 
meeting 
The day of the European Central Bank’s Governing Council meeting 
Underbidding at end   
of RMP 
Allotment and settlement days of the last regular main refinancing operation in the December 2003 
RMP, 16 and 17/12/2003 
Policy rate change  The day at which a change in the policy rate is announced 
  
Other variables   
it  Money market interest rate of the respective maturity 
i
*
t  Policy rate, or target rate, which is defined as the fixed rate (until June 27, 2000) and the minimum 
bid rate (after June 27, 2000) at which the European Central Bank conducts its weekly open market 
operations. Any change in the policy rate is assumed to become effective at the day of announcement, 
not at the day when the next open market operation is settled 
Et[i
*
t+k]  Expected future policy rate. Proxied by a forward rate constructed with one and two-week EONIA 
swap rates 
ut  Supply shock, which is approximately the forecast error on autonomous factors   
 
20CS p e c i ﬁcation tests
Lagrange multiplier tests for all variables listed in the following tables have been
performed for all money market rates, both on mean and volatility equations.
Test results indicate that at the 1% signiﬁcance level almost all of these variables
are correctly omitted from the models as outlined in the tables above. There
are no obvious ways of including the few remaining signiﬁcant variables.
Table 9
Lagrange multiplier tests for omitted variables; Only for EONIA rate
Liquidity eﬀects and lagged dependent and explanatory variables
Omitted variable 
(A) Lagged dependent variable: 
Dt = ∆it-2, for all days, t = 1,..,T 
Dt = ∆it-22, when t = T 
 
(B) When t is the first day in a RMP and 
Dt = ∆it-1 
Dt = ∆it-2 
Dt = ∆it-3 
Dt = it-1 – i
*
t-1 
Dt = it-2 – i
*
t-2 












(D) Liquidity effects around end of month; Dt = ut-1 when t falls on: 
Begin of month 
End of month 
Begin of quarter 
End of quarter 
 
(E) Liquidity effects at the end of a reserve maintenance period: 
Dt = ut-1, when last allotment was before t and  
t equals T-1 
t equals T-2 
t equals T-3 
 
Dt = ut-2, when last allotment was before t-1 and 
t equals T-1 
t equals T-2 
t equals T-3 
 
(F) Liquidity effects before the last settlement day of a RMP: 
Dt = ut-1, when t is before the last settlement day 
NOTE: See appendix B for a detailed description of the abbreviations used. The variable Dt takes value 
zero unless otherwise specified. H0: Dt is correctly omitted from the original model specification.  
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Lagrange multiplier tests for omitted variables
Days of the reserve maintenance period
Omitted variable 































(F) Dt = 1 when t equals T and:  
T is a settlement day 
T is NOT a settlement day 
T-1 is a settlement day 
T-1 is NOT a settlement day 
T-2 is a settlement day 
T-2 is NOT a settlement day 
 
(G) Dt = 1 when t equals T-1 and:  
T-1 is a settlement day 
T-1 is NOT a settlement day 
T-2 is a settlement day 
T-2 is NOT a settlement day 
 
(H) Dt = 1 when t falls on: 
The last settlement day in each RMP 
The last announcement day in each RMP 









































(L) Dt = 1 when t falls on: 
The day of a Governing Council meeting 
The day of a press conference 
The day of a press conference, before December 2001 
All days before November 9, 2001 (bi-weekly policy decisions) 
The day of a policy rate change 
The day after a policy rate change 
NOTE: See appendix B for a detailed description of the abbreviations used. The variable Dt takes value 
zero unless otherwise specified. H0: Dt is correctly omitted from the original model specification.  
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Lagrange multiplier tests for omitted variables
Calendar days
Omitted variable 







(B) Dt = 1 when t is: 
























Begin of any quarter 
  
(C) Dt = 1 for t being the day after: 
Begin of month 









Begin of any quarter 
NOTE: See appendix B for a detailed description of the abbreviations used. The variable Dt takes value 
zero unless otherwise specified. H0: Dt is correctly omitted from the original model specification.  
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Lagrange multiplier tests for omitted variables
Transmission of conditional EONIA volatility
Omitted variable 
(A) Dt = conditional EONIA volatility when t equals: 
T 
T-1 
T-2, T-3 or T-4 
 









End of month 
Begin of month 
Day after begin of month 
First day in a RMP 
The day of a policy rate change 
The day after a policy rate change 
The last allotment day in a RMP 
The allotment day at which underbidding occurred 
The day after an underbidding allotment 
Two days after an underbidding allotment 
Three days after an underbidding allotment 
 
(C) Dt = 1 when t falls on: 
The day of an underbidding allotment 
The day after an underbidding allotment 
Two days after an underbidding allotment 
Three days after an underbidding allotment 
The last day of a RMP at which underbidding occurred 
The next to last day of a RMP at which underbidding occurred 
Two days before the end of a RMP at which underbidding occurred 
NOTE: See appendix B for a detailed description of the abbreviations used. The variable Dt takes value 
zero unless otherwise specified. H0: Dt is correctly omitted from the original model specification.  
 




































































































Figure 1: Logarithm of Conditional Volatility of the EONIA rate. Estimated
with the model as described in table 2.






























































































Conditional Log Volatility Days after last allotment
Figure 2: Logarithm of Conditional Volatility of the EONIA rate (left scale).
Estimated with the model as described in table 2. Dotted lines represent a
dummy variable taking value one on all days after the last allotment day until


































































































Figure 3: Logarithm of Conditional Volatility of the One-month EONIA Swap
Rate. Estimated with the model as described in table 4.




























































































Conditional Log Volatility Days after last allotment
Figure 4: Logarithm of Conditional Volatility of the One-month EONIA Swap
Rate (left scale). Estimated with the model as described in table 4. Dotted lines
represent a dummy variable taking value one on all days after the last allotment
day until the last day of a RMP and value zero otherwise (right scale).




























































































Conditional Log Volatility Days after last allotment
Figure 5: Logarithm of Conditional Volatility of the Twelve-month EONIA
Swap Rate (left scale). Estimated with the model as described in table 7.
Dotted lines represent a dummy variable taking value one on all days after the




































Policy meeting (before Nov 2001 ) Policy meeting PC "Norm a l"
Figure 6: Volatility curves for diﬀerent days of the reserve maintenance period.
The blue line (with stars) represents the volatility curve for the ECB’s Governing
Council (GC) meeting days, before November 2001. Up to this date monetay
policy decisions were made (in general) at every GC meeting. From November
2001 onwards monetary policy decisions were made (in general) only at the ﬁrst
GC meeting of each month, coinciding with the press conference (PC). The
volatility curve for days of the press conference is given by the green line (with
circles). The volatility curve for all policy meetings, i.e. all GC meetings before
November 2001 and the ﬁrst GC meeting in each month afterwards, is plotted
in yellow (with triangles). The volatility curve for days which are not policy
meeting days is shown as a black line (with cubes). Volatility is measured as
the average conditional standard deviation, as estimated from models outlined
i nt a b l e s2t o7 .
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